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Abstract : Our main objective is to study the impact of consumption externality
like keeping of with the Joneses on the properties of long-run equilibrium in the two-sector
optimal growth model. Does this consumption externality lead to a new mechanism of
local indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations ? We will see that, in two-sector growth
models with exogenous labor and without technological externalities, if the representative
agent is able to give more value to his social status than his own consumption, this is the
keys of a new mechanism for endogenous fluctuations. Moreover, by opposition with the
other endogenous fluctuation mechanisms, we will see that this one doesn’t need to have
restriction on the factor intensity configuration of the consumption sector.
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1 Introduction
The study of endogenous fluctuations, i.e. the existence of a continuum
of equilibria that arises in dynamic economies with some market imperfec-
tions, have given a lot of results. In general equilibrium model, the existence
of a continuum of equilibria which converges to the same steady state is
relied to the local indeterminacy property of the steady state. Generally, in-
determinacy emerges with small market distortions as a type of coordination
problem. Following Benhabib and Nishimura[7], these distortions lead to a
mechanism such that, starting from an arbitrary equilibrium, if all agents
were simultaneously increse their investment in an asset, the rate of return
on the asset would tend to increase, and in turn set off relative price changes
that would drive the economy back towards steady-state. In the one-sector
models, increasing returns, via external effects on production or monopo-
listic competition, are able to generate this mechanism. In the two-sector
models, the rate of return and marginal products depend not only on stocks
of assets, but also on the composition of output across sectors. Increasing
the production and the stock on a capital, say due to an increase in its price,
may well increase its rate of return. It is possible therefore to have constant
aggregate returns in all sectors at the social level (but decreasing at the
private level) and to still obtain indeterminacy. For that, it has to have
external effect, through sector specific externalities, at least in one of the
sectors. Consequently, the major contributions of Benhabib and Nishimura
[7] and Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [8], in the two-sector model with
different Cobb-Douglas technologies at the private level with sector-specific
externalities and constant social returns to scale, Benhabib and Nishimura
[7] prove, with a separable utility function which is linear in consumption and
strictly concave with respect to labor, that local indeterminacy arises if and
only if technological externalities allow to have a reversal of factor intensities
between the private and social levels (i.e. the consumption good is capital
intensive at the private level and labor intensive at the social level). There-
fore, there exists technological mechanism coming from externalities which
brokes the duality between Rybczynsky and Stolper-Samuelson effects and
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leads to indeterminacy. In all these contributions, an implication of decrea-
sing private returns is positive profits. The presence of such profits (even
quite small) would invite entry, and unless the number of firms cannot be
constant along the equilibrium and a fixed cost of entry has to be assumed
to solve this problem, but it is not really satisfying.
More recently, Nishimura, Takahashi and Venditti [18] have proved that
indeterminacy is possible without any market distortions, so in the two-
sectors optimal growth discret time models with CES technologies, non linear
preferences are able to generate a mechanism such that for high enough values
of elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, indeterminacy is
led, but only if the consumption good is capital intensive. In this case, this is
the intertemporal arbitrage behavior of the representative agent and his ca-
pacity to substitute future consumption to the present one that is the source
of the endogenous fluctuations. Indeed, oscillations in the consumption and
investment goods output, led by fluctuations, require some oscillations in
the consumption levels, that is the case when the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is high enough (i.e. the degree of concavity of
the utility function is low enough). In this line, Garnier, Venditti and Nishi-
mura [12] have introduced non linear utility in consumption in the two-sector
continous-time model with sector specific externalities such that there are
constant returns to scale at the social level but decreasing at the private
level. With the breaking of Rybczynsky and Stolper-Samuelson effects (like
in Benhabib and Nishimura [7] and Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [8]),
they prove the existence of sunspot fluctuations is obtained if and only if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is large enough and
the elasticity of labor supply is low enough (even equal to zero). Therefore,
the role played by non linear preferences seems the same than the one of
Nishimura, Takahashi and Venditti [18], that is, it allows the representative
agent to smooth his consumption over time.
In all these contributions, a necessary condition to obtain indeterminacy
is the presence of capital intensive consumption good since the coordination
problem needs that all agents increase their investment in the capital asset
what leads to a first increase (before the future decreases coming from the
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fluctuations) of the more capital intensive good : the consumption. Whereas
the output of the consumption good increases, the consumption of agents
too. Then, even if this rise of the consumption will be followed by future
decreases, the representative agent has a present time preference and is able
to smooth his consumption over time. For these reasons, this indeterminacy
mechanism is accepted by the agents. The major problem of the existence of
capital intensive consumption good is that the capital share in the production
function has to be greater than the labor share, but we know that this fact
is not consistent empirically. Moreover, whereas the consumption good is
capital intensive, then the investment good has to be labor intensive.
In order to show that it is possible to have a new mechanism of endoge-
nous fluctuations led only by the preferences and that, even if the consump-
tion good is not capital intensive, we introduce a new type of externality
called keeping up with the Joneses. This consumption externality operates
through the utility function by adding an exogenous variable that represents
the consumption standard of the economy. The idea that the happiness of
an individual depends upon the consumption of others is widely viewed as
an important feature of our shared social existence. The introduction of
consumption standard in the utility function generates an externality which
increases the felicity that each individual obtains from his own consumption
(i.e. the utility function is increasing according to the consumption stan-
dard). Preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" since we assume
that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing with respect to the
externalities.
Liu and Turnovsky [17] have showed that the consumption externalities
do not generate indeterminacy, in one-sector growth model with exogenous
labor supply. Moreover, we know from Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich
[1] that consumption externalities are a source of indeterminacy in one-sector
growth model with endogenous labor supply. So, in this paper, we will show,
in the two-sector growth model that endogenous labor supply is not necessary
to have equilibrium indeterminacy with consumption externalities. Moreover,
we will see the indeterminacy results are only linked to consumption exter-
nality in preferences (i.e. keeping up with the joneses). The major difference
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between the results of Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich [1] and ours re-
sults is that we do not make any assumption on the weight of consumption
externality (i.e. on the sensibility of the representative agent according to
the consumption standard) whereas they suppose the consumption externa-
lity plays a neglicted role compared to the consumption. Consequently, we
choose to interpret the relative consumption of the representative agent (i.e.
the ratio between his own consumption and the consumption standard) as
his social status. Hence, we do not make any assumption on the weight of
consumption externality so we can suppose that the social status may have
the same kind of importance than the consumption for the representative
agent. We also let the representative agent have a behaviour which main-
tains his social status over time. We will see, such situations create a new
mechanism for sunspot fluctuations. First, to obtain general results we do not
specify the utility function. Then, we take a Cobb-Douglas utility function
to illustrate the relationship between social statuss and own consumption.
Consequently, keeping up with the Joneses in the optimal growth
continous-time model with two-sector leads to a new mechanism of suns-
pot fluctuations even if the consumption good is labor intensive. The labor
intensive configuration for consumption good in the continous-time two setor
model is quite new in the litterature on endogenous cycles but it seems more
satisfying according the empiral results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the eco-
nomy. Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 gives
formal conditions to obtains local indeterminacy. Section 5 analyzes the me-
chanism that leads to equilibrium indeterminacy.
Section 6 gives an example of utility function that allows the existence of
indeterminacy and illustrates our main result through a standard parametri-
zation of the model. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are collected
in the appendix (section 8).
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2 The economy
We consider an infinite horizon, continous-time, two-sector model with
Cobb-Douglas technologies, inelastic labor supply and consumption exter-
nalities through "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences. The economy
consists of competitive firms and a representative household.
2.1 Firms
We assume that consumption good y0 and capital good y1 are produced
by capital x1j and labor x0j , j = 0, 1, through a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Hence, the "private production function" used by the representative firm in
each industry is given by :
yj = Fj (x0j , x1j) = x
βj
0jx
1−βj
1j for j = 0, 1 (1)
with βj ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore the returns to scale are constant, in each sector j = 0, 1.
We normalize the price of consumption good to one i.e. p0 = 1. The
representative firm in each sector j = 0, 1 maximizes its profit ⇡j given the
output price pj of the good produced in sector j, the wage rate w0 and the
rental rate of capital w1, subject to production function 1. The first order
conditions give :
a0j(w1, pj) =
βjpj
wi
=
x0j
yj
a1j(w1, pj) =
(1−βj)pj
wi
=
x1j
yj
(2)
for the factor i in the sector j. We call aij the input coefficients. The
factor-price frontier, which gives a relationship between input prices and
output prices is expressed with these input coeffcients.
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Lemma 1 : Denote p = (1, p1)
0, x = (1, x1), y = (y0, y1), w = (w0, w1)
0
and A(w, p) = [aij(wi, pi)]. Then :
p = A0(w, p)w
x = A(w, p)y
Note that at the equilibrium the wage rate and the rental rate are func-
tions of the output price only i.e. w0 = w0(p1) and w1 = w1(p1) whereas out-
puts are functions of the capital stock and the output price i.e. yj = yj(x1, p1)
for j = 0, 1.
2.2 Household
We assume that the population is constant and normalized to one. The re-
presentative agent derives his utility from consumption according to function
U (c(t), z (t)) ,where c(t) is the individual consumption, z(t) the consump-
tion externality given by the consumption average of the economy which
can be interpreted as the consumption standard. The function U satisfies
the standard hypothesies on the behavior of the consumer with respect to
the consumption : the marginal utility in consumption is positive and de-
creasing. Moreover, the introduction of consumption standard implies that
consumption spillovers affect the household’s utility. Indeed, we assume that
preferences correspond to the "keeping up with the Joneses" formulation
such that the marginal utility of consumption rises with the consumption
standard. Hence the following assumption holds :
Assumption 1 : U(., z(t)) is increasing and concave ∀z(t) ∈ R+, the first
partial derivatives satisfy Uz(c(t), z(t)) > 0 and Uc(c(t), z(t)) > 0 and the
second partial derivatives satisfy Ucz(c(t), z(t)) > 0 and Ucc(c(t), z(t)) < 0
We introduce the following elasticities :
✏cc = −
Uc (c(t), z (t))
c(t)Ucc (c(t), z (t))
> 0 (3)
✏cz =
Uc (c(t), z (t))
c(t)Ucz (c(t), z (t))
> 0 (4)
6
where ✏cc is the elasticity of intertemporal susbstitution in consump-
tion and ✏cz is the absolute value of the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and consumption standard.
The enhanced value of the consumption standard by the agent is positi-
vely correlate to ✏cz. We introduce the ratio
c(t)
z(t) as the relative consumption
of the agent (i.e. the ratio between his own consumption and the consump-
tion standard of the economy). Note that this ratio can be interpreted as his
social status.
The elasticity ✏cz can be interpreted as a measure of the importance given
by the agent to his social status. In most of the models using "keeping up
with the Joneses" formulations, it is common to assume that ✏cz <✏cc i.e.
Ucc + Ucz < 0 in order to have a consumption externality that has smaller
effects on the preference of the representative agent compared to his own
consumption. Consequently we do not make any assumption on the weight
of consumption externality since we suppose that the social status may have
the same kind of importance than the consumption for the representative
agent 1. Therefore, we can have ✏cc < ✏cz i.e. Ucc + Ucz > 0 that is, we
consider that the agents may give more weight or more importance to their
social status rather than to their own present consumption.
The objective of the representative agent is to solve the following inter-
temporal optimization problem by taking z(t) as given :
max
y1(t),x1(t)
´
1
0 e
−δtU (c(t), z(t)) dt
s.c. x˙(t) = y1(t)− gx1(t)
x1(0) = x1 given
(5)
Where δ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and g ∈ (0, 1) the deprecia-
tion rate of capital. The production frontier is defined as :
c = T (x1, y1) = x
β0
00x
1−β0
01
1. We note that there is no problem about the concavity of the utility function when
we suppose that ✏cc < ✏cz as z(t) is take as given by the representative agent.
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From the enveloppe theorem we easily get w1 = T1(x1, y1) and p1 =
−T2(x1, y1)
2.
The Hamiltonian in current value of (5) is :
H = U(T (x1, y1) , z(t)) + q1(t)(y1(t)− gx1(t)) (6)
The first order conditions are :
p1(t)Uc (c(t)) = q1(t) (7)
q1(t) (δ + g)− w1Uc (c(t)) = q˙1(t) (8)
y1 − gx1 = x˙1 (9)
lim
t!+1
x1(t)Uc (c(t)) p1(t)e
−ρ.t = 0 (10)
Where q1 is the co-state variable which corresponds to the utility price
of capital in current value.
3 The competitive equilibrium
Let us denote :
↵ =
1
✏cc
−
1
✏cz
(11)
If ✏cc < (>) ✏cz then we have ↵ > (<)0.
To obtain the dynamic equations characterizing the symetric equilibrium
i.e z = c, we combine (7) and (8) and since c = c(x1, p1), after a total
differentiation of (7), we have the two equations of motion which describe
the dynamic of equilibrium paths :
x˙1 = y1 (x1, p1)− gx1 (12)
p˙1 =
1
E(x1, p1)

p1 (δ + g)− w1(p1) + ↵
p1
c
@c
@x1
(y1 (x1, p1)− gx1)
]
with
E(x1, p1) = 1− ↵
p1
c
@c
@p1
(13)
2. Note that y0 = c(x1, p1) = T (x1, y1(x1, p1)).
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3.1 Steady state
Any solution {x1(t), p1(t)}t>0 of the system (12) satisfying the transver-
sality condition (10) will be called equilibrium path.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique steady state (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) > 0 solution of :
x˙1 = 0 ⇐⇒ y1 (x1, p1) = gx1
p˙1 = 0 ⇐⇒ w1(p1) = p1 (δ + g)
See appendix 8.1 for details.
3.2 Caracteristic polynomial
In order to study the indeterminacy properties of equilibrium, we linearize
the system (12) around (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) which gives the following Jacobian :
J =
 
∂y1
∂x1
− g ∂y1
∂p1
α
E
p1
c
∂c
∂x1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘
1
E
h
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
+ ↵p1
c
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
i ! (14)
Any solution from (12) that converges to the steady state (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) satisfies
the transversality condition and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given initial
capital stock x1(0) if there is more than one initial price p1(0) in the stable
manifold of (x⇤1, p
⇤
1), the equilibrium path coming from x1(0) will not be
unique. In particular, if the Jacobian matrix J (14) has two eigenvalues with
negative real part (the locally stable manifold of the steady state (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) is
two dimensional), there will be a continuum of converging paths and thus a
continuum of equilibria : (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) is said to be locally indeterminate.
The dynamics of the model around the steady state can be fully derived
from the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix (14) or from the roots λ1 and λ2 of
the caracteristic polynomial :
P (λ) = λ2 − Tλ+D (15)
where T and D are respectively the trace and the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix (14).
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The trace and the determinant T and D are given by :
T = λ1 + λ2 =
1
E
⇢
∂y1
∂x1
+ δ − ∂w1
∂p1
+ ↵p1
c⇣
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
− ∂c
∂p1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⌘} (16)
D = λ1λ2 =
1
E
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
(17)
We know that the steady state is locally indeterminate if and only if
T < 0 et D > 0. Therefore, we have to study the sign of T and D in function
of b and ↵.
4 Existence of local indeterminacy
Our main objective is to study the impact of consumption externality
measured by the elasticity ✏cz on the local determinacy properties of the
long-run equilibrium.
Solving the system (16-17) with respect to ↵ gives a linear relationship
between T (↵) and D (↵) : when ↵ varies, T (↵) and D (↵) move along the line
called in what follows ∆α(see appendix 8.3 for the proof), which is defined
by 3 :
D = SαT +Mα
with
Sα =
∂c
∂p1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
+ ∂c
∂p1
⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘ (18)
Mα =
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘⇣
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
− ∂c
∂p1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⌘
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
+ ∂c
∂p1
⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘ (19)
Note that Sα and Mα depend only upon technological parameters.
In their previous paper, Garnier, Venditti and Nishimura [11] have al-
ready studied the case where the utility function is non linear, under the
3. Note that (x∗1, p
∗
1) does not depend on ↵ and remains the same along the line ∆α.
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presence of sector-specific externalities such there is capital intensity rever-
sal between the private and the social level, they have proved the existence
of sunspot fluctuations is obtained if and only if the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption is large enough and the elasticity of labor
supply is low enough (even equal to zero). Therefore, we will see that wi-
thout externalities (i.e. constant returns to scale), it is possible to have a
room of local indeterminacy led by keeping up with the Joneses. The case
where ↵ > 0 cannot provide local indeterminacy, indeed, in the two-sector
model without consumption externalities, Garnier, Venditti and Nishimura
[11] have shown that it must have sector specific externalities to have local
indetermincy even if the utility function is non linear (which corresponds to
the case where ↵ = 1/✏cc). Therefore, we can deduct that whereas the level
of consumption externality is low (i.e.✏cc < ✏cz and ↵ > 0), the presence
of consumption externality cannot change the results obtained by Garnier,
Venditti and Nishimura [11] . Consequently, we focus only on the case where
the level of consumption externality is sufficiently large to have ✏cc > ✏cz and
thus ↵ < 0.
We use the geometrical method of Grandmont, Pintus and De Vilder [13]
in order to study the variations of T (↵) and D (↵) in the (T,D) plane, when
↵ varies continuously on ]−∞, 0[.
We make the following assumption :
Definition 1 : The consumption good is said to be capital (labor) intensive
if and only if :
a00a11 − a01a10 < (>)0
At the steady state, it’s possible to give this last condition only with the
technological parameters βij :
Proposition 2 : Let b ≡ β0 − β1. At the steady state we have : a00a11 −
a01a10 < (>)0 ⇔ b < (>)0
So, when ↵ gets from −∞ to 0, the pair (T (↵) , D (↵)) moves along the
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half line ∆α
4 characterized by a starting point (T (∞) , D (∞)) :
T (∞) = −
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
∂c
∂p1
+
@y1
@x1
− g (20)
D (∞) = 0 (21)
and a end point (T (0) , D (0)) such that :
D (0) =
✓
@y1
@x1
− g
◆✓
δ + g −
@w1
@p1
◆
(22)
T (0) = δ (23)
Consequently, as the ending point is characterized by D (0) < 0 (since
∂y1
∂x1
= ∂w1
∂p1
) and T (0) = δ then indeterminacy is ruled out for ↵ = 0 whereas
the starting point is located on the abscissa area since D (∞) = 0 .
If we can verify both T (∞) < 0 and D is an increasing function of ↵
then the half line ∆α gets by the indeterminacy area (T < 0 and D > 0).
We have to give conditions to have T (∞) < 0 and dD
dα
=
p∗1
c∗E2
∂c
∂p1
D (0) > 0.
We can see immediately that dD
dα
depends only on the sign of the derivative
∂c
∂p1
since D (0) < 0 and then we must verify ∂c
∂p1
< 0. In this case, the pair
(T (↵) , D (↵)) enters in the indeterminacy area when ↵ gets from −∞ to
a critical value ↵¯ then it gets out of the indeterminacy area and finishes
on the point (δ,D(0)). Otherwise, T (∞) > 0 implies dD
dα
< 0 and the pair
(T (↵) , D (↵)) moves in the wrong way : local indeterminacy is ruled out
(see appendix 8.5 and 8.4).
Proposition 3 : Suppose that β1 > β1 ≡
δ
2δ+g , then there exists β
⇤
β1
≡
−
g
δ+g
β1(1−β1)
(1−2β1−g
(1−β1)
δ+g
)
> 0 such that ∀β0 > β
⇤
β1
we have dD
dα
> 0 and T (∞) < 0.
5
(Proof : see appendix 8.5 and 8.4)
4. When ↵ > 0, the pair (T (↵) , D (↵)) moves along the another part of the half line
∆α : see Garnier, Venditti and Nishimura [12].
5. Where β∗β1 is a critical value that depends on the value that we have choosen for the
labor share in the investment sector β1.
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Assumption 2 : The labor share of the investment sector verifies : β1 >
β1 ≡
δ
2δ+g .
Finally, when 3 is held and since ∆α is a half-line and D (↵) is an in-
creasing function of ↵ and T (∞) < 0, the pair (T (↵) , D (↵)) gets by the
indeterminacy area when ↵ increases from −∞ to 0 and finishs on the
point (T (0) , D(0)) such that T (∞) < 0 and D (∞) = 0+ (as the pair
(T (↵) , D (↵)) comes from the half-plan where the values of D(↵) are posi-
tive). More precisely, there exists ↵¯ ∈ ]−∞, 0[ such that the steady state is
locally indeterminate ∀↵ ∈ ]−∞, ↵¯[.
Hence, we give the following lemma :
Lemma 2 : Under assumptions 1 and 2 : suppose that β1 >
δ
2δ+g , ∀β0 >
β⇤β1
∃↵ ≡ 1p1
c
dc
dp1
∈ ]−∞, 0[ such that ∀↵ < ↵ the steady state (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) is locally
indeterminate and ∀↵ > ↵ the steady state (x⇤1, p
⇤
1) is saddle point.
This lemma gives a condition set which gives endogenous fluctuations wi-
thout any restriction on the factor intensity of the consumption good. In-
deed, there is just a critical value on the labor share in the consumption
sector β⇤β1(linked on the labor share of the investment sector β1) and a cri-
tical value of the labor share in the investment sector through assumption 2
(linked on the discount time and depreciation rate) ; it is sufficient to choose
β0 > β
⇤
β1
to obtain local indeterminacy for any quite small value of ↵ (i.e. ↵
must be smaller than ↵). Therefore, endogenous fluctuations don’t depend
on the factor intensity of the consumption sector. This result is in sharp
constrast with the ones of Benhabib, Nishimura and Venditti [8] or Nishi-
mura, Takahashi and Venditti [18].
5 Endogenous fluctuations mechanism
This result means that consumption externality like "keeping up with the
Joneses" gives rise to new mechanism of indeterminacy which is not linked
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to the one coming from technological externalities.
We can provide an heuristic explanation to understand how the "keeping
up with the Joneses" leads to local indeterminacy. We know that ↵ has to be
negative to lead to the equilibrium indeterminacy. When ↵ < 0, the agent
favours his social status c(t)
z(t) more than his own consumption c(t) over time.
Now, starting from an arbitrary equilibrium, consider that the agent ex-
pects another one with a higher rate of investment and higher level of capital
stock coming from an instantaneous increase in relative price of investment
good p1. The only way that this other equilibrium path becomes a new equi-
librium path is to find a mechanism which reverses the price toward the
equilibrium and offsets this initial increase. Since the labor supply is exoge-
nous, if one of the both goods (consumption or investment) increases (de-
creases) then the other one decreases (increases). Suppose, for example, that
the investment good is capital intensive (b > 0), then a higher capital stock
implies an increase (more than proportional) of output of the investment
good and a decrease (more than proportional) of output of the consumption
good and thus in the own consumption of the representative agent and in
his social status. But the representative agent, who gives more value to his
social status than his consumption, wants to keep his social status over time
and thus has to increase his future consumption. The level of this rise in the
consumption depends on the level of the externality measured by ✏cz. In-
deed, there are two opposite effects playing through the decreasing marginal
utility in consumption (i.e. Ucc < 0) and through the positive effect of exter-
nality on this marginal utility (i.e. Ucz > 0 ). Since, we have assumed that
Ucc + Ucz > 0, the overall effect of this decrease in the present consumption
and in the social status leads to a decrease in the marginal utility. Therefore,
the representative agent has to increase more than proportional his future
consumption to conserve his level of utility. Consequently, the present de-
crease in the consumption of the representative leads to a large increase of
his future level of consumption. To support this future level of consumption
the output in this sector will have to increase and as the labor is exogenous,
that will lead to a large decrease of the output in the investment sector what
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will reverse its price p1 toward the equilibrium and offsets its initial rise
6.
But, to ensure that this increase of level of consumption has a sufficient de-
creasing impact on the output of the investment sector, the labor share in
each sector has to be greater than a critical value which depends only on
the depreciation rate g and discount time δ for the investment sector (i.e as-
sumption 2) but depends also on the labor share β1of the investment sector
for the consumption sector (i.e. β0 > β
⇤
β1
).
6 Examples
Let us consider Cobb-Douglas formulation between the social status c(t)
z(t)
and the consumption c(t) such as :
U(c(t), z(t)) =
1
1− σ
"
c(t)1+γ
✓
c(t)
z(t)
◆
−γ
#1−σ
where β > 0 represents the weight of the consumption externality or the
sensibility of the representative agent according to the standard of consump-
tion z(t), and σ > 0 represents the individual risk aversion. This function
satisfies assumption 1. We can derive the following elasticities :
✏⇤cc =
1
σ
✏⇤cz = −
1
γ(1− σ)
Therefore :
↵ = σ(1 + γ)− γ
Note that for any γ > 0, if σ = 0 (i.e. the utility is linear with respect
to the consumption) then ↵ < 0 and if σ = 1 then ↵ = 1 Therefore ∀γ > 0,
∃σ˜ ∈ [0, 1[ such that ∀σ ∈ [0, σ˜[ we have ↵ < 0.
We want to illustrate the lemma 2) for both capital and labor intensive
consumption good
6. We note that there is a symetric mechanism, but in the opposite way, when the
investment good is labor intensive.
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6.1 Labor or capital intensive consumption good
We use a parametrization according empirical results on the labor share
in european countries :
β1 = 0.62
g = 0.05
δ = 0.01
This configuration givesβ1 = 0.142 and β
⇤
β1
= 0.35, that means that we
can take any value greater than 0.142 for the labor share of the investment
sector and greater than 0.35 for the consumption sector to obtain endogenous
fluctuations. Moreover we can choose this value in order to have labor inten-
sive or capital intensive consumption good. For example, if we set β0 = 0.6
then we have b = −0.02 and the consumption good is capital intensive, mo-
reover, we obtain the following critical value : ↵ = −0.05, that is we can
set, for example, σ = 0.2 and γ = 0.32 (i.e. all value of σ and γ such that
σ(1 + γ)− γ < −0.05. Otherwise, if we set β0 = 0.65 then we have b = 0.03
and from now, the consumption good is labor intensive, moreover, we ob-
tain a new critical value for the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption : ↵ = −0.01, for example σ = 0.2 and γ = 0.27.
7 Concluding comments
In this paper we have shown that a new mechanism can bring endogenous
fluctuations. It comes only from preferences and the behavior of the repre-
sentative agent toward his social status. Since Benhabib and Nishimura [7],
endogenous fluctuations were the result of market imperfections coming from
technological externalities leading to a capital intensity reversal between the
private and social level. Our new mechanism is totaly independent of that of
Benhabib and Nishimura. Moreover, the consumption good may be capital
or labor intensive by opposite to the model with market imperfection where
the endogenous fluctuation need a capital intensive consumption good. This
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mechanism depends on the behavior of the representative agent : he has to
give more value to his social status than his own present consumption.
The most important results is that we have a mechanism of endogenous
fluctuations that not implies capital intensities reversal or capital intensive
consumption goo, but only the assumption that the representative agent
gives some value to his social status. The direct consequence is that, for
the first time in this type of model, we have endogenous fluctuations under
constant returns to scale, that is without any type of technological externa-
lityor market imperfections, moreover with labor intensive sectors.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of existence of (x⇤1, p
⇤
1)
The maximization of profit gives the following first order conditions :
wi = pjβij
yj
xij
for i, j = 0, 1 (24)
The steady state is characterized by : y1 = gx1 and w1 = (δ + g) p1, so
that :
x11 =
1− β1
δ + g
gx1 (25)
Moreover we have :
x01 = gx1
✓
1− β1
δ + g
◆
−
1−β1
β1
(26)
The stock equations : x1 = x10 + x11 et 1 = x01 + x00 allow to give :
x10 = x1
✓
1− g
1− β1
δ + g
◆
(27)
x00 = 1− gx1
✓
β11
δ + g
◆
−
1−β1
β1
(28)
From (24) we have :
x00x11
x01x10
=
(1− β1)β0
(1− β0)β1
(29)
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From (25), (26), (27), (28), (29), we have :
x⇤1 =
⇣
1−β1
δ+g
⌘ 1
β1
1−β1
δ+g g
⇣
1− (1−β1)β0(1−β0)β10
⌘
+ (1−β1)β0(1−β0)β1
> 0 (30)
For i = 1and j = 0, (24), (27) and (30) give :
w⇤1 = (1− β0)
✓
(1− β1)β0
(1− β0)β1
◆β00 ✓1− β1
δ + g
◆
−
β0
β1
(31)
We derive :
p⇤1 =
1− β0
δ + g
✓
(1− β1)β0
(1− β0)β1
◆β00 ✓1− β1
δ + g
◆
−
β0
β1
> 0 (32)
8.2 Computation of derivatives used in T (α) and D(α)
In order to compute (16) and (17) we need the following partial deriva-
tives : ∂y1
∂x1
, ∂c
∂x1
, ∂w1
∂p1
,∂y1
∂p1
, ∂c
∂p1
.
To compute ∂y1
∂p1
and ∂c
∂p1
we begin by the total differentiation of the quan-
tity equations given by :
a00y0 + a01y1 = 1
a10y0 + a11y1 = x1
The total differentiation gives :
a00dy0 + a01dy1 +
@a00
@w0
y0dw0 + y1
✓
@a01
@w0
dw0 +
@a01
@p1
dp1
◆
= 0 (33)
a10dy0 + a11dy1 +
@a10
@w1
y0dw1 + y1
✓
@a11
@w1
dw1 +
@a11
@p1
dp1
◆
= dx1(34)
After, we need ∂c
∂x1
and ∂y1
∂x1
with c = y0 and dw0 = dw1 = dp1 = 0. Then,
we have :
@y1
@x1
=
a00
a11a00 − a10a01
(35)
@c
@x1
= −
a01
a11a00 − a10a01
(36)
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These derivatives correspond to the Rybczynsky effect.
Now, compute ∂y1
∂p1
and ∂c
∂p1
. With the price equations given by :
a00w0 + a10w1 = 1
a01w0 + a11w1 = p1
So :
@w1
@p1
=
@y1
@x1
(37)
@w0
@p1
= −
a10
a11a00 − a10a01
(38)
On the other hand we derive from
a0j(w1, pj) =
βjpj
wi
=
x0j
yj
a1j(w1, pj) =
(1−βj)pj
wi
=
x1j
yj
that :
@aij
@wi
= −
aij
wi
(39)
@aij
@pj
=
aij
pj
(40)
We substitute (37), (38), (39) et (40) in (33) and (34). Hence, the reso-
lution of the system (33) and (34), with dx1 = 0 give :
a00dy0 + a01dy1 + dp1
 
a01
p1
y1 −
✓
p1 −
aˆ11
aˆ10
◆
−1
!
= 0 (41)
a10dy0 + a11dy1 + dp1
 
a11
p1
y1 − x1
✓
p1 −
aˆ01
aˆ00
◆
−1
!
= 0 (42)
Using (41) and (42) we have thus :
@y1
@p1
=
a00
a11a00 − a10a10
1
p1
✓
β0
β0 − β1
x1 −
a10
a00
1− β0
β0 − β1
◆
−
gx1
p1
(43)
@c
@p1
= −
a01
a11a00 − a10a10
1
p1
✓
β0
β0 − β1
x1 −
a11
a01
1− β0
β0 − β1
◆
(44)
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8.3 Computation of ∆α
Consider the expressions T (↵) (16), D(↵) (17) and E = 1− ↵.p1
c
. ∂c
∂p1
With (16) and (17) we can extract ↵ :
↵ =
D (↵)−
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
p1
c
∂c
∂p1
D (↵)
=
T (↵)−
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
+ δ − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
p1
c
∂c
∂p1
T (↵) + p1
c
⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
(45)
Therefore :
D =
∂c
∂x1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
+ ∂c
∂p1
⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘ T+
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘⇣
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
− ∂c
∂p1
⇣
∂y1
∂x1
− g
⌘⌘
∂c
∂x1
∂y1
∂p1
+ ∂c
∂p1
⇣
δ + g − ∂w1
∂p1
⌘
(46)
where Sα is given by (18) and Mα is given by (19)
The computation of the derivative dT
dα
and dD
dα
give :
dT
d↵
=
p⇤1
c⇤E2

@c
@x1
@y1
@p1
+
@c
@p1
✓
δ + g −
@w1
@p1
◆]
(47)
dD
d↵
=
p⇤1
c⇤E2
@c
@p1
✓
@y1
@x1
− g
◆✓
δ + g −
@w1
@p1
◆
(48)
When technological parameters are fixed, only E depends on ↵ in the
expression of these derivatives. Hence, it is easy to show that the sign of ∂T
∂α
and ∂D
∂α
does not depend on ↵ and remains constant ∀ ↵.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3 dD
dα
< 0
We have to prove that dD
dα
> 0. Since we can rewrite 48 as dD
dα
=
p∗1
c∗E2
∂c
∂p1
D(0) and since D(0) is always negative we have to give conditions
to have dc
dp1
< 0. From 40, we can rewrite ∂c
∂p1
with the parameters of the
model :
@c
@p1
= x1 (δ + g)
⇢
β1 (1− 2β0)
b2
+
✓
1− g
1− β1
δ + g
◆
1
b
}
(49)
When b < (>)0 we have β0 < (>)β1 and since 1 − g
1−β1
δ+g > 0 (since
g
δ+g < 1 and 1−β1 < 1), consequently, we have several cases where
∂c
∂p1
< 0.
20
Let β⇤β1 ≡ −
g
δ+g
β1(1−β1)
(1−2β1−g
(1−β1)
δ+g
)
a critical value which depends on the labor share
in the investment sector such that we have ∂c
∂p1
> 0, ∀β0 > β
⇤
β1
, where the
critical value β⇤β1 depends on the labor share in the investment sector β1,
that we have setted but not on the factor intensity configuration of sectors.
Moreover, we have to ensure that this critical value is positive, that is garan-
ted by β1 >
δ
2δ+g . Consequently : when β1 >
δ
2δ+g is checked, then ∀β0 > β
⇤
β1
we have ∂c
∂p1
< 0 and thus dD
dα
> 0.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 2 T (∞) < 0
T (∞) (eq.15) is linked on the sign of the derivative ∂c
∂p1
, ∂y1
∂p1
and b (as we
know that b < 0 gives ∂y1
∂x1 < 0 and
∂c
∂x1
> 0). As we know conditions which
give ∂c
∂p1
positive, we have to study the impact of these ones on the sign of
T (∞).
From 43, we can rewrite ∂y1
∂p1
with the parameters of the model :
@y1
@p1
=
gx1
p1

1
b2
δ + g
g
β0 (2β0 − 1)− 1 +
1− β0
b
]
(50)
Now, from 20, 49 and 50 we can write T (∞) with the parameters of the
model as :
T (∞) =
x1
b2w0
[gβ1 (1− β0 − b) + β0 (1− β0) (δ + gβ1)]
∂c
∂p1
− g (51)
Since ∂c
∂p1
has to be negative we have to check that the sign of the nume-
rator of T (∞) is positive. Moreover, to verify ∂c
∂p1
< 0 we have to check that
β0 > β
⇤
β1
, which implies the numerator of T (∞) is positive and if ∂c
∂p1
< 0
then T (∞) is always negative. Consequently, it explains why T (∞) must be
negative and why T (∞) > 0 rules out local indeterminacy.
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